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INTELLECTUALISM IN ARISTOTLE
David Keyt
University of Washington

1978

I
When Aristotle returns to the topic of happiness at the end of the Nicoma
chean Ethics (X.6-8) presumably to give us his final and best thoughts on the

he says that perfect happiness (he. teleia eudaimonia) is theoretical
that happiness and contemp lation (theoria) are
coextensive, and that the life of reason (ho kata ton � bios), also called
1
the philosophic or theoretical life (I.5.1095bl9,
�.E. I . 4 . 12 1 5bl-2 , �passim),
is the happiest life (X. 7.1177al2-18, 1178a4-8, 8.ll 78b 7-32).
He goes on to say
matter,

activity (the�retik� energeia),

that the life in accordance with the other excellence (ho kata tl!'n allen areten
the life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue,

bios)--namely,

elsewhere called the political or practical life
is the second happiest life

(X. 8.1178a9-22).

(I. 5. 1095 bl8 , Pol. VII. 2.1324a40)-
And he draws a sharp contrast between

the activities that characterize the two lives:

aims at no end beyond itself,

'

theoretical activity is leisured,

and is loved for its own sake whereas practical ac

tivity is unleisured, aims at an end (other than itself),

its own sake

(X. 7.1177bl-26).

and is not chosen for

As for the relation between the two sorts of activ

ity, Aristotle implies that practical activity is merely a means to theoretical
"
we work in order that we may have leisure and wage war in order
that we_ may have peace" (X. 7 .1177b4-6).
activity:

•

•

•

These remarks raise a major and well-known interpretive problem about Aris
totle's· ethical ideal. and his conception of the best life for a man,

for they seem

to conflict with things he says earlier in the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere.
They seem to conflict,

making (poiesis)
ment.

in particular, with his account of the distinction between

and doing (praxis)

and with the conclusion of the function argu

In distinguishing making and doing,

Aristotle says that "the end of making

is something different from the making, but not the end of doing;
(eupraxia)

itself is� end"

for good action
(VI.5.1140b6-7); and in arguing that the goodness of

an action is unlike the goodness of a product of. one of the arts, he insists that

The goodness of a pro
for an act to be good it must be chosen for its own sake.
duct of one of the arts (a shoe or a statue) is a quality of the work itself; but,
Orte
Aristotle argues, the goodness of an act is not a quality of the act itself.
must also consider the agent's state of knowledge, his motive,
For an act to be good it must be done wi th knowledge,
chosen for its own sake,

b9).

and his character.

it must be chosen and

and it must issue from a stable character (II.4.1105a26-

This account of good action appears to directly contradict Aristotle's

statement in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics that practical activity, in
contrast to theoretical,

its own sake.

aims at an end (other than itself)

and is not chosen for

The conclusion of the function argument is that "the good for man turns out to

be activity of·soul in accordance with virtue (kat' areten),
eral virtues,

and if there are sev

in accordance with the best and most final" (or "tnost complete",

teleiotatc§n)(I. 7.1098al6-'18).

There are two interpretations of teleiotate arete.
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II

issu� raised by the apparent conflict of Aristotle's remarks in
o f the.Nicomach�an Ethics with those expressed earlier in the

the
treatise

9 is that of the relation of the life of practical wisdom and

irt other works

virtue to the best life for a man--the relation of moral action to happiDoes Aristotle abandon in Book X the view of Book I and elsewhere that

nibral activity is a subordinate end, a component of happiness, in favor of the
v ew tha: t it is merely a subservient end, only a means to happiness?

i

The difference between a component and a means may be iilustrated by the
difference between the activity of an ancient choregus in selecting the members
of a chorus, outfitting it with costumes and masks, and providing for its training,

which is one of the means to a dramatic performance,
chorus in the performance of a play,

and the activity of the

which is a component.

.
secondary component, of the dramatic performance itself 10

·

though perhaps a
This distinction is

similar to one that Aristotle himself draws between a part (meros) and a neces�
sary condition ll that is not a part (E.E. I.2.1214bll-27, Pol. VII.8.1328a21-b4,
9.1329a34-39).
A citizen� for example, is a part of a po li"S"' (Pol. III.Ll274b38- 41)
whereas property is not a part but only a necessary condition

(Pol.

VII. 8.1328a33-35).

Eating meat and taking a walk after dinner are for some people necessary conditions

(E.!.

of health without being themselves parts of health

I.2.1214bl4-24).

In Book X Aristotle seems to be espousing the view, which I shall call
''strict intellectualism," that theoretical activity is the sole component of the
best life for a man and that practical activity has value only as a means to
theoretical activity.
hesita
Cooper

£ � on:

Some scholars have attributed this view to him without
2
for example, in the nineteenth century and John

Alexander Grant, 1

today . But some hesitation is in order.
For strict intellectualism, as
14
in addition ta being inconsistent with the doctrine of Book I,

is well known,

has unpalatable moral consequences,
moments)

would not accept;.

which Aristotle

(at least in his more worldly

According to strict intellectualism it would be right.

for one person to steal from or to defraud another in order to obtain the wealth
required to have the leisure for theoretical activity,
justifies the means.

possible ever to be right with regard to these things
adultery,

theft,

for Qn this vitlw the end

But Aristotle says that theft is always wrong:
[namely,

and murder], but to do them is always to be wrong"(II.6.1107al4-15).

Aristotle may be espousing strict intel'le.ctualism in Book
its

"It is not

such things as

unpalatable consequences or in spite of them.

X

without being aware of

Still, it niay be worthwhile to

try once more to rescue Aristotle 1 s ethical philosophy from inconsistency and
immorality.
One possibility is that Aristotle is embracing a moderate rather than a
By "moderate intellectualism" I mean the view

strict intellectualism in Book X.

that theoretical activity is the primary but not the sole component of the best
Moderate, unlike strict,
life for a man, moral action being a secondary component.
intellectualism is consistent with the doctrine of Book I.

But there are several

versions of moderate intellectualism corresponding to the various ways of com
bining moral and intellectual activity while preserving the primacy of the latter.
And some of these have consequences almost as unpalatable as those of strict
intellectualism.

So it will be well before turning

the various possibilities.

Suppose that moral action;

.

·

.,-,

,,

, .,

to Book X to sort

and grade

as moderate intellectualism affinns, has value in

.

'
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�

ctivity.
The value it has
itself and not simply as a means to theoretical
1
with the value of theoretical
independently will then either be commensurable
In this case the independent
Suppose it is commensurable.
activity or µot.
·

.
value of moral action can always be weighed against the value of theoretical
choos
must
one
engaging
which
in
betWeen
e
arises
situation
a
when
activity; and

in contemplative activity and performing some moral action, the activity of
lesser value can bes.acrificed for that of greater value with the aim of maxi

I shall call this the "trade-off" view.
mizing the total value in one's.life.
the value of theoreticaLa.ctivity, which for Aristotle resembles

According to it,

the activity of God, is related to the independent value of moral activity,
The details
activity that is wholly human, as the value of gold is to silver.
of this view--namely, how to measure the value of moral and theoretical activity

and how to balance the value of the one activity against the value of the other-
are difficult to envisage, but the view is sufficiently precise for one to
see some of its consequences.

Since on the trade-off view the value of a morai

action can sometimes exceed that of a competing theoretical activity,
of the view will sometimes sacrifice theoretical for moral activity.

for example,

an adherent
He wight,

trade an hour of contemplative activity for an · act of liberality or

munificence.

Similarly,

On the other hand,

the owner of a silver mine might pay his workers in gold.

it would be right according to the trade;..off view for a person

·who is poor but intelligent to steal from or to defraud another person if this
were the only means he had to obtain the wealth required to have the leisure for
theoretical activity.

For the value of an act of honesty (in this case refraining

from theft or fraui\) can,

on this view, be outweighed by the value of a certain

amount of theoretical activity.
course,

since the former,

unlike the latter,

theoretical activity
and,

An adherent of the trade-off view will,

of

have scruples in many cases where the strict intellectualist will not

if not,

needs always to consider whether the end of

can be achieved without acting contrary

t.o the moral virtues

whether the theoretical activity sought is worth the moral cost.

Suppose,

to take the other alternative,

that moral action has value in

itself and not simply as a means to theoretical activity but that the value it
has independently is incommensurable with
the value of theoretical activity.

(and thus cannot be weighed against)

One will want to consider in this case

whether theoretical activity is absolutely prior to moral activity or not.
it is,

we have the "absolute priority" view.

on the precept,

If

An adherent of this view will act

Maximize theoretical activity first;

then maximize moral activity.

Thus he will perform moral actions for their own sake but only when they do not
interfere with his theoretical activity.

a moment of theoretical activity,
action,

however noble.

unpalatable

He will never,

however uninspired,

for example,

sacrifice

for a disinterested moral

The consequences of this view are only slightly less

than those of strict intellectualism.

Unlike the strict intellectualist,

whose attitude toward any action that neither promotes nor hinders his theoretical
activity is indifference,

an adherent of the absolute priority view will act in

accordance with the moral virtues when unable to contemplate or to do anything
that will promote his theoretical activity;
he will do anything,
Suppose,

however base,

but,

like the strict intellectualist,

that promotes his theoretical activity.

to take the final case,

that theoretical activity is the primary

and moral action a secondary component of the· best life for a man,

that the

value that moral action has in itself is incommensurable with the value of
theoretical activity, but that theoretical activity is not absolutely prior to

moral action.

There is a view that fits this description.

According to it,

- 6 -

theoretical activity is more desirable .than moral activity--one would spend all

of one's time engaged in it if that were humanly possible, which it isn' t--and
But what is most desirable
is in t
: his sense the primary component of happiness.
must be pursued within the constraints placed upon a person by his bodily nature,
.
by his family and friends, and. by his polis.
The idea is that theoretical ac
tivity is to be maximized but only within the constraints of the life of practi
cal wisdom and moral virtue.

Moral activity is the foundation and theoretical

Moral action will not,
the superstructure of the best life for a man.
This view is not
on this view, be absolutely prior to theoretical activity.
The demands of civic and domestic life
simply the converse of the preceding one.
are so indehni te and potentially s.o all consuming that there would few, if any,
opportunities for contemplation if moral activity were given absolute priority
over theoretical.
Such a priority would violate the primacy of theoretical ac
tivity.
According to the "superstructure" view, the moral life sets certain
minimum requirements that must be satisfied before one is· to engage in theoretical
activity

activity;

but the view does not demand that one should riever shirk a

ever trivial,

for an opportunity to contemplate.

duty,

how

Where the line is drawn will

presumably be determined by the moral intuition of the practically wise man

phroniinos).

The fol1owing table displays the various

(ho
-

possibilities:

Moral action

�

component of happiness

(moderate in

value of,

F

not a component

(strict intellectualism)
-

commensurable with

that of theoretical activity

�

not commensurable

(trade-off view)

theoretical activity

not absolutely

(absolute priority view)

(superstructure

absolutely prior to

prior to
view)

III

Ackrill's and Cooper's acute but divergent discussions of Aristotle's

account of eudaimonia exemplify in various ways each of the four specific possi

bilities.

Ackrill maintains that "the question

combine in the best human life]

[how theoria and virtuous action would

is incapable of even an outline answer that

Aristotle could accept" ("Eudaimonia", p. 357).
Ackrill reaches this conclusion
because it seems to him that Aristotle's theology and anthropology together

- 7 -

yield a consequence that is irreconcilable with his respect for ordinary moral
According to
A ckrill's argument, as I interpret him, goes like this.
views.
the divine is incommensurably more valuable than the

Aristotle's theology,

And, according to his anthropology, man is "a compound of
Theoria is the
'something divine' and much that is not divine"(p.358).
activity of man's divine component while virtuous action belongs to his earthly

merely human.

Therefore,

nature.

act i on (p.

over it

357)

theoria is "incommensurably more valuable" than virtuous

and in the best life for man must be given absolute priority

(pp. 357-58).

Aristotle's anthropology and theology thus lead to what
But this view, Ackrill points out,

I called the "absolute priority" view.

has

the consequence "that one should do anything however monstrous if doing it has
the slightest tendency to promote theoria
must find "paradoxical" (ibid.)

•

•

•

"(p.358)--a consequence that Aristotle

since he wishes to adhere "reasonably closely to

ordinary moral views" (p. 35 7).
"The only way to avoid such paradoxical and inhuman consequences," Ackrill
believes,

"would be to allow a certain amount of compromise and trading between

theoria and virtueus action, treating the one as more important but not incom
parably more important than the other"
endorses the trade-off view.

(p.

358).

Ackrill thus for his own part

But he seems to be mistaken in supposing that this

view does not share some of the paradoxical consequences of the absolute priority
view and in supposing that the trade-off view is the only alternative available.
Cooper,

in fact,

Ackrill considers.
the Eudemian Ethics,

attributes to Aristotle a view different from any that

He finds what I have called the "superstructure" view in
in Books VII and VIII of the Politics,

books of the Nicomachean Ethics--namely,
[eudaimonia]

"

and in the middle

a conception of human

flourishing

that makes provision for two fundamental ends--morally virtuous

activity and intellectual activity of the highest kind.
subordinate to the other;
provided for first,

moral virtue comes first,

Neither of these is

in the sense that it must be

but once moral virtue is securely entrenched,

goods are allowed to predominate"

(.£E._.

cit.,

pp.

142-43).

then intellectual

Cooper believes,

that Aristotle adopts an intellectualist ideal of the best life in Book
X of the Nicomachean Ethics and that he paves the way for this ideal in Book I

however,
(pp.

100,

14 7-48,

et passim).

By "intellectualism" Cooper means "the view that

human flourishing consists exclusively in pure intellectual activity of the best
kind" (p.

90)--the view that I have called "strict intellectualism."

Aristotle to embrace strict intellectualism,
that "one is his theoretical mind"
interpretation,

(p.

168).

according to Cooper,
Aristotle does not,

completely ab andon the superstructure view;

What leads

is his doctrine
on Cooper's

the life described by

this view is simply downgraded in the final book of the Nicomachean Ethics from
best to second best (pp. 177-80).
Cooper ·is led to this interpretation of Book X partly by a philological
consideration--namely,

by what he thinks Aristotle can and cannot mean by the

Greek word bios ("life").

This matter needs to be examined since it raises a

fundamental issue of how Aristotle is to be read.

IV

What does Aristotle mean by a "life," a bias?

The traditional answe;r· is
6
the

that each of the various "lives" that Aristotle mentions--the apolaustic, 1
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'qua') locution as part of his standard terminology to signify one aspect of a
.
.
He says, to take a simple example, that
thing in abstraction from all others.
(Phys. I.4.187b7; see also III.6.207a25..;.
unknowable"
is
infinite
"the infinite qua
need not be completely unknowable but
object
infinite
an
that
this
by
26) meaning

on ly in the respect in which it is infinite� if a surface were infinitely lon g
Or, to con
but only an inch wide, one could know its width but not its length.
sider another example, speaking of natural science Aristotle says that "there are
many statements about things merely qua moving (he kin()umena), ,apart from what
.
each thing is and from their incidental properties" (Met. M. 3.1077b23,....24). .
There is n ow an answer,

or a sort of answer,

lyzin g the function argument.

to a puzzle that arose in ana-

It seemed that of all livin g things God alon e

lacked a distinctive function since his only activity,

ity in which man can share.

contemplation,

.

is an activ

The answer is that man does n ot engage in this activ
reason or nous.23

ity as man but only as possessor of someth ing divine--namely,

In so far as man can contemplate he is a god himself.

v

The way is now clear for an interpretation of Nicomachean E th ics

minimizes· th e conflict between it and the rest .of the work.

X. 6-8

that

Aristotle begins his

final and consummative d iscussion of happiness by considering whether happiness

lies in play
questions.

(X. 6).

Th is preliminary discussion raises at least two interpretive

First, what exactly is th e view that Aristotle is c on si de rin g ?

secondly, what contribution,

if an y,

And,

does this discussion make to Aristotle's

ultimate conclusion that perfect happiness is theoretical activity?

The word paidia, along with two other words that figure in the .discussion in
chapter 6, paidikos ('childish') (1176b33) and paizein ('to play lik e a child'-''
then: 'to play', 'to je st', 'to dance , 'to sing', 'to play at a game') (ll76b30, 3 3 ),

( ' c hild ' ) (l176b22 ,

is derived from the word pais

2 3).

This d eri vat i on undoubtedly

assists the conclusion of chapter 6 that happiness does not li e in play
since a pais is ateles (undeveloped) (see Pol.

the telos

(end) of a man (see

!·!·

I . 12 .1259b3 -4),

II. l.1219b4-8).

paidia Gan h ard ly be

The ran ge of application of the word paidia is very wide.

example,

64 3B4-D4,
80 3El-2),

paidia covers among oth er things children's games
79 3E3-794A4), war games

(Laws 829B7-Cl),

In Plato,

(Polit.

carousing (Prot.

religious sacrifices (Laws 803El),

347D6,

Laws 673E8ff.).

for

308D3-4,

singin g and dancin g (Laws

the mimetic arts from dan cin g to drama (Soph. 2 34Blff.,

Polit. 288Cl-10),

(1176b27-28):

Laws

Rep. 602B6-10,

puns (Grat. 406C3-4),

and

Human life for Plato is divided into

just two ph�- -play (p"rldia) and seriousness (spoude) (for the dichotomy s ee

Rep. 602B8,

Polit. 288C9-10, Laws 643B6,

bein g a pr ep arat i on for,

64 3B4-D4,

796Al-D5,

counts as p aid i ai ,

a means to,

647D6-7,

7 32D6,

797A7ff.,

942A8).:...;.play

or a relaxation fro m serious e n d eavor s (Laws

Phil. 30E6-7).
It is not so clear what ac t iv itie s Aristotle
for he is not as lavish with examples as Plato.
But a few

examples may be gleaned from the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics.
He mentions
children's games (Pol. VII.17.1336a21-30) an d urban e and witty conversation
(eutrapelia) (!.N. II. 7. 11 08a2 3-26 and IV.8)

purpose of sleep,

1 3 3 9al4 -2 1 ) .

drink, music,

Interestin gly,

valued amon g boys (1176b22),

an d reports the common view that th e

an d dance is play and relaxation

(Pol.

VIII.5.

in c hapter 6 Aristotle alludes to the things

to those who are ready-witted

(eutrapeloi) in the
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(102lbl4-23,

Phys. VII. 3. 246al3-16).

having reached its end

(3)

(telos):

captured in English by such expressions

as 'fully realized' and 'fully developed' and predicated, for example�
of an adult in contrast to a child (102lb23-30, Pol. I. 12. 1 2 5 9b3 - 4).2�

If teleia has sense (1) in the expression he teleia eudaimonia, then Aristotle's
conclusion expresses the strict intellectualist view that complete (or total)
If teleia has either sense (2) or sense (3),
happiness is theoretical activity.

then

conclusioh can be given a weaker,

his

activity.
Both

moderate intellectualist

as distinct from complete,

that perfect or fully realized,

interpretation-

happiness is theoretical

formulations of Aristotle's conclusion will thus bear a moderate intel
Although such an interpretation even seems indicated

lectualist interpretation.
for one of the two,

the perfect ambiguity of the other makes one hesitate to

claim on the basis of an analysis of the verbal formulations alone that such an

interpretation of Aristotle's conclusion is demanded.

Aristotle's argument.

One must also consider

What sort of intellectualism does it entail--moderate or

strict?
If Aristotle's argument entails one view but not the other,
3
good reason for attributing the one rather than the other to him. 0

this is a

On one interpretation strict intellectualism is entailed by that part of

Aristotle's argument which is based on the philosophical idea that the activity
This

that constitutes happiness is activity in accordance with excellence.

subargument opens
leading ideas

(ll 77a12-21)

and closes

(1177b26-1178a8) chapter 7,

are introduced at the end of Aristotle's

though its

discussion of play

(6.1177al-ll).

Most English translations of these passages obscure the simple relations between the

key terms of the argument and make it almo,st unintelligible,
comments about its terminology are in order.

arete ('goodness',

'excellence',

so a few elementary

The argument is based on the noun

'virtue')(see 1177a2,

10,

12,

17,

b29) and three

forms of the comparative and superlative of its simple adjective agathos
comparative:

(1177a3,

ameinon

(1178a3)

kreitton

superlative: 'best'

'better'

belti�n

(1177a6,

Rendered literally,

( 1 good'):

beltistos

4, 6)

b26)

kratistos
aristos

(1177al3,

19,

(1177al3)

the argument of ll 77al.-21 runs

as

b34,

1178a5-6)

follows:

1.
2.

Happiness is activity in accordance with goodness

3.

So the activity of the best part is best and most conducive to happiness

4.

Reason

5.

(al-2,

12).

And the activity of the/ better part of a man is better and hence more
conducive to happiness

(a5-6).

(see al2-13).

(nous) is the best thing in us,

knowable objects
Therefore,

(a20-21,

see Stewart,

and its objects are the best of

ad loc.).

the activity of reason is the best activity and the one most

conducive to happiness.

As Aristotle expresses it,

"

•

•

•

the activity

[of

reason] in accordance with its proper goodness will be he teleia eudaimonia"
(al6-17).

The premisses of this

happiness,

argument entail, not that theoretical activity is complete
but only that it is perfect or fully realized happiness.

- 13 -

But when Aristotle returns to this theme at the end of chapter 7, he seems to
advance beyond his earlier claim that reason is the best (but not the only) thing

in us and to claim now that a man and his reason are identical: "This [viz. reason]
would also seem·to ·be each man, since it is the authoritative and better part.

Thus it would be-;ddif he were to choose not his own life but that of someone else"
(1178a2-4).

Similar assertions occur in two earlier passages in Book IX (4.1166al0-

seems to be)

identified is not the same in the two books.

23

, 8.1168b28-1169al8).

However,

the element or faculty with which a man is

or reasoning element (to dianoetikon,
identified

"'7,"

(1166al6-1

22-23,

to nc;>oun,

1168b35),

since

(or

In Book IX the thinking

nous) w:i.th
it1i"as the

which a man seems to be

abilit
to guide action
31
or his intellect
and to control the passions, must be either his practical reason
In Book X, on the other hand,
as a whole32 --practical, productive, and theoretical.
the reason in question must be the theoretical reason alone. 33
is said to be theoretical

(ll 77al7-18 et passim),

is explicitly distinguished from it
ferences,

the passages in Book IX,

interpretation of 1178a2-4.
Now,

For its activity

and practical wisdom

(8. 11 78a l6-22). 34

as we shall see,

But,

(pronesis)

in spite of these dif

provide the clue to the proper

if a man is strictly identical with his theoretical reason and if practi

cal reason is not a p.art of theoretical reason, . then practical· reason is not a.·
part of a man.

On the strict-identity hypothesis practical reason will be merely

something without which a man cannot exist,

like food (Met.

b..5 ,.. 1015b20-22)--not

a part of man but only a necessary condition of his existence. 3:>

Practical and

theoretical reason will be related as the lower and higher order in Aristotle's

ideal state

VI. 4.129la24-28 and VII. 8-9).

(see Pol.

The warriors,

and priests who compose its higher order are its parts.

officeholders,

The farmers,

craftsmen,

and tradesmen who compose its lower order, though the state cannot exist without
are not parts of it:

them,

their role is to serve the members of the higher order.

On the strict-identity hypothesis practical reason will be subservient to theoretical

in just the same way;

and Aristotle will,

be embracing strict intellectualism.

as Cooper claims

(£E_.

cit. pp
·

•

.

162-63),

But does Aristotle really mean to claim that a man is strictly identical with

his theoretical reason?

There is good reason for thinking not since his statement

that reason "would also seem to be each man" (ll78a2)
"

•

•

•

for man,

then,

this ·[viz.· reason] most of all

t � be less than,

is immediately qualified:

the life according to reason [is best and pleasantest], since
(malista) is man"

and so nonidentical with' man.

36

(a6-7).

To be most of all man is

That this reservation is seriously

intended is indicated by its earlier appearance in the two passages in Book IX where

a man is identified with his thinking faculty.
that "the reasoning element would seem· to be,

man"

(4.ll66a22-23);

second--"That this
clear"

sole,

(8.1169a2).

·

In the first of these Aristotle says

or to be most of all

(e

malista),

each

and the reservation is repeated in almost the same words in the

[viz.

reason] is,

or is most of all

(e

malista),

But to claim that reason is the�st-important,

part of a man is simply to reiterate a premiss--namely,

argument of 1177al-21,

line

each man is

but not the

(4)-.;..of the

an argument that does not entail strict intellectualism.

Other parts of the overall argument of chapter 7 that need to be examined are

those in which Aristotle tries to show that theoretical activity is leisured and
alone loved for its own sake whereas military and political activities

(the pre

eminent practical activities) are not chosen for their own sakes and are unleisured
(1177bl-24).

Aristotle offers the same consideration in support of both conclu

sions--namely, that military and political activities aim at an external end but
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and theoretical activity•

The moral virtues have a role to play in both phases

"Bravery and endurance are needed for work, philosophy for leisure,
temperance and justice at both times, and more especially when men observe peace

of life:

f o r war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the
enjdyment of good fortune and the possession of leisure accompanied by peace
Aristotle's remark that
makes them rather insolent" <M· VII.15.1334a22-28).
work is for,the sake of leisure thus does not imply strict intellectualism.
and have leisure;

VII
Chapter

contains three additional arguments for the conclusion that perfect

8

happiness is theoretical activity.

(1)

The gods are paradigms of happiness but

their lives consist entirely of theoretical, rather than practical or productive,

activity;

"so of human activities that which is most akin to this is the most

conducive to happiness"

(1178b 7-23).

The whole of the life of the gods, con

(2)

sisting as it does of ceaseless contemplation, is blessed

(makarios); so too is

the life of man in so far as it is spent in such activity; but none of the lower
animals are happy since they in no way share in contemplation.

contemplation extends,

so also does happiness;

more fully belongs happiness also more fully belongs,
virtue of the contemplation."

(b24-32).

those most loved by the gods are the happiest;

happiest

then, as

not incidentally but in

Therefore, happiness is

He who exercises his (theoretical)

'3)

"As far,

and to those to whom contemplation
a

kind of contemplation

reason is most loved

therefore,

by

the gods;

the wise man is the

(1179a22-32).

The second argument requires examination,

for the part of it that is directly

quoted seems to identify happiness and contemplation straightforwardly and,
sequently,

to be an unambiguous expression of strict intellectualism.

argument will,

think,

I

The second argument follows

bear another interpretation.

directly upon the first and begins with the words "A proof,
(s�meion de kai

•

•

•

).

too,

is that •

• . "

This indicates that it is intended to establish the same

.conclusioU-as the first--namely,
(1178b7-8).

con

But the

that he teleia eudaimonia is theoretical activity

Now, if he: teleia eudaimonia means,

as

realized rather than-Complete happiness throughout

eudaimonia mean teleia audaimonia in argument

(2),

it seems to, perfect or fully

X.7-8

and if makarios and

then Aristotle's statement that

happiness and contemplation are coextensive will mean simply that perfect or fully
realized happiness is coextensive with contemplation.

patible with

a

moderate intellectualism that allows

happiness of moral and political activity.
small puzzle about the argument--namely,

a

But this assertion is com

place for the secondary

This interpretation also resolves a

that Aristotle's explanation of the

fact that happiness is not attributed to the lower animals seems inadequate.
are incapable of happiness,

They

one would suppose, not simply because they are inca

pable of �ontemplating but also because they are incapable of practical
thinking.47
But if Aristotle is thinking only of perfect or fully realized happi
ness,

his explanation is completely adequate.

VIII
Thus with the exception of the one statement that theoretical activity "alone

would seem to be loved for its own sake" (1177bl-2)

X.6-8

there seems to be nothing in

that is inconsistent with a moderate intellectualism and with the rest of

- 16 -

Can it be strengthened?
This is a fairly weak conclusion.
the Nicomachean Ethics.
Is there anything in these three chapters that can be taken to be an expression of

In particular, can anything be taken to be an expression
moderate intellectualism?
of the only reasonable version of moderate intellectualism;......,namely, the super
structure view according to which theoretical activity is to be maximized within
the

constraints of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue?

Aristotle's famous injunction ''as far as possible to inunortalize oneself
and to do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best thing in
oneself

[viz.

the theoretical reason]"

is an expression of the

(7 .1177b33-34)

superstructure view if the restriction signified by the words "as far as possible"

includes moral restrictions as well as those of mind, body,
The answer to this question can be gleaned,

and estate.

Does it?

I think, from a passage in chapter 8

where Aristotle is discussing the extent to which the theoretical life and the

life in accordance with practical wisdom and moral virtue need external equipment
and where he seems for once to combine the two lives:

has no need of such things
ao

[viz.

-:Bt

to speak even impediments

external goods]

"The person who contemplates

for his activity;

least to contemplation;

however,

but they are

as he is a man

and lives with a number of others, he chooses to do those things that are in accord

ance with

[sci!.

moral]

living as a man"
contemplates

virtue;

{ll 78b3-7).

{ho theoron),

he will therefore need such things with

qua man,

view to

chooses to act in accordance with moral virtue. 48

Arthur Adkins in a recent article remarks,

however;

that Aristotle "does not tell

he may well mean 'chooses when theoria is not available. 'n49

us when he chooses:
On Adkins'

a

Here Aristotle states explicitly that the person who

interpretation the author of this passage might without inconsistency

condone the conduct of a man who refused to interrupt his theoretical activity in
order to rescue a neighbor from a burning building.

Thus Adkins believes the

passage to be consistent with what I have called the "absolute priority" view--

then maximize moral

the view whose precept is, Maximize theoretical activity first;
activity.

First,

But there are at least two reasons

for rejecting Adkins' interpretation.
qua�'

Aristotle says that the person who contemplates,

in accordance with moral virtue.

human being--at one moment .. and at another not.
life just as he is always

an

chooses to act

But a person is not a man--that is to say,
He is

a

a

human being all of his

animal and always a living thing.

Thus once the moral

virtues are acquired he is always prepared to act in accordance with them.
Secondly,

possession of the moral virtues would seem to be inconsistent with their

erratic exercise.

The brave man defends his polis whenever the enemy attacks,

just at his convenience.

Thus if the person who contemplates,

to act in accordance with bravery,

ical activity for battle.

and as

a

theoret

consistent with

It seems better to take it as picking up the theme

the centerpiece of Book One:

namely,

aspects of a person's total life...,-his life as a living thing,

a man,

not

chooses

he must always be prepared to sacrifice

So this passage does not seem to be

the absolute priority view.

of the function argument,

qua man,

that the various

as an animal,

as

demigod--form a hierarchy with the higher aspects resting on and

presupposing the lower.

If my interpretation is correct, Aristotle does indeed subscribe to the

superstructure view:

�

one should seek to immortalize ones lf but only within the

bounds of the life of practical wisdom and moral virtue. O

~

Ǫ U

[jǪ



Ú Ǫ Ôŉǂ Ǫ /+Ǫ Ǫ ƌǪ "ĢǪ îďhŽþĐĸģÿǥ)ǃĹŊđǪ ǛŭǪ ǄĺƷŋǪ
ǅŌ/ĚǪ

 Ǫ

 v3(&º0%Ǫ
 5 A äěǪ $öŇǪ 4`oEh \JǪ ƁǪ !NJǆŮsƸǪ )ǇĻFĒ$Ǫ
Ǫ È.Ǫ =ęǪ AƋa=Ǫ BǪ @L ƨ{Ǫ õĤĀƹƂǪ IR ãǚžƶǪ áhĜǪ Ǫ Õ-ōmGǪ @<ƩŎİǪ

BĎanǁSǪ
Ǫ

=  Ö+ũưŠ

5 0SǪ

Ǫ 55 Ǫ
įǪ ~[W ÛƱŢţƺ Ǫ

Ǫ ÞĝHƃŏǩ$Ǫ

Ǫ

  ÌÅ´QǪ ƚ VǪ » Ǩ®4Ǫ

;k Ǫ 8Ǫ  /ŷŸ#;Ǫ ×,Ʋ ftǪǪ ů Ǫ

% 

6ƀǪ  Ǫ

+

àƪǪ ǈļǪ gǪ Ǫ ÝǪ 2 

&Ǫ

5uw NĽǪ EƧāƄǪ :Ǫ   _Ǫ

ÄǪ

ő9Ǫ ]ƍ

ëǖǪ

å7µû3T¯ª%Ǫ #) ,F.!
ĦǪ 6Ǫ.

.(' ±Ǫ



Ǫ 7è¼ &ü¶RǪ Ǫ `ŒŨƆ+ǉǪ :ƳHǪ MǪ ,ƇĂǪ

;Ǫ   xǪ
' Ǫ

*ħǪ ^ Ǫ \dƻǪ / 4FijFN Ǫ !-œƎ uǪ ØƬĴ<ƈNǪ ČǊǪ ~\W â9 >Ǫ BX
wðǋƭǪ ?½ 0Ǫ HQ AǪ ? !ŪƵŰű|Ǫ !-Ə )mľēƼǪ
ï#Ǫ øƮbǪ ? yzǪ Ɯ 1Ǫ «.%Ǫ 44Ǫ

( Ǫ

BKMǪ ŲǡǪ ň=PǤoOǪ

ì8 ųǪ ƝĘFGźǢǪ ¥¦Ñ²U(1Ǫ

*Ǫ ZƐ Ǫ  +ŕ Ǫ ƞ

Ǫ

& ¢YǪ
£.Ǫ [Ǫ ƑĿƯǪ Ŗ ǌŤƒǪ :Ǫ "Ǫ ĞŗǍŘĔǗLǪ ƽĨǪ > 8 6 7xYYquuU| PunYqGy
Ǫ ·Â¸ Ǫ
uq 3uuf C: /Ǫ  Ǫ CĕHĄ"ĊǪ )"+Ǫ @ąſř`;EǪ Í2ÎR%Ǫ
¤Ǫ "Ǫ 

+ŀǎǪ Że ǣÒǪ > ǏǪ #ŁǪ # ĖłǪ _} b| Ǫ ƟŚ 1$Ǫ



# ŴĩǪ

Ǫ

9;Ǫ

Ƣ Ǫ Ǫ <Ǫ

ć kǪ c| gǐĈŵǪ ǝǘńǪ ŜÓǪ DǪ

 ƉğrǪ ÷
Ǫ ) Ǫ Ɣ/Ǫ !iǑ Ǫ ùíƕƊǪ §Ê'ÁúǪ


Ǫ s
uk <;

Ǫ XÃQǪ
WXǪ *ĪǪ č # Ǫ
4Ǫ *Ǫ Ù,Ǫe Ǫ $!-ťǒǓ Ǫ =Ǫ ß9<Ş >Ǫ

Ǫ ³À'Ǫ _ĠǪ Zi -Ǫ  ǦÜ }Ǫ

ƣ Ǫ 3¹?T2Ǫ

3¾Ǫ IDGīǔǪ IƤǪ ò Ǫ éê7 ¡Y°ĭĮǪ
&Ǫ

Ǫ

ŦƿǪ 7 25ċŬÆǪ

ÇǪ ]u
'Ǫ

Ǫ

W(Ǫ

Ǫ

Ǫ 8 ¨( Ë Ǫ

Kat{ pP
O ǪO 9 & "*Jg 
Ǫ ^Ŷ1Ǫ 8'©&D Ǫ

.Ǫ ^u ǀƗǙbǪ Ldu| @sl æ6Ï ¬ 2ý¿Ǫ
 Ǫǧ*Ǫ AVǪ 0 *#ĉǕǪ CLEǪ uq ŅǪ
Ǫ )'$()-

)ņǪ ñǞ:Ǫ

ÉÐ0%Ǫ ǜc Ǫ 6ç%Ǫ

° H-ʰ 

 ʰ 

Ǥ/ ʰ Ŋʰ ď.ɠ Ǯ¸ʰ

)à ʰ

Įʰ (łɟʰ ;yuʰ .ʰ

2

Ĝ/Rʰ ɡwūʰ ŝyʚO .ɢʠʰ /Rʰ ɁzŞO?OȐOɣʡʰ ƍʰ  Ŭʰ   *,*38"+< Å_Jʰ ķ+şʰ

;<
mʰ 
2 1$%/4 /"


  







)" ʰ

Ĭ ʰ

x ʰ

Fʰ

ʰ ü#Ĉʰ ƶʰ

,
)÷3ʰ

 U3ʰ o70ʰ Dʰ p ʰ   p  ʰ ĐƷ! Ƞ ŭċʰ

,Ĩ? ʰ Dʰ K.ʰ ÊCýB ʰ

/ʰ UR.  ;ʰ 1 ƹ*ʰ Kǰ ¡ʰ

ėʰ



,ơ/ǱAʰ RŮƻPʛŠʰ ʬʰ !#2
Ǩ¢ʰ wƽWʰ Pʰ  ʰ ɜʰ

ƺvʰ ʰ

Ơ ʰ 7ʰ

]ʰ ]&ȡČʰ &*ʰ
Ƽʰ

Mʓʰ ŔȢǲůA ʰ

*Űʰ F ʰ

ɇʰ

/ʰ ɤűʰ * ʰ :ʰ

ʰ ,ĳ  H"účʰ KǴ ʰ İġ ʰ
" Æ±#ʰ Ë5¹Ìð"Í#ʰ ıº4»I44gE)-²ÎJJ-ǵ£ʰ
6Ųʰ

(ɝ/ʰ ĝPšƾʰ 6 ȋ ʰ 
r;ʰ 6ɦ @ʰ Ȓʰ ħ $+ŵʰ 6ɚ~

2

{2ʰ Ɉ|Ƿʰ @ĩ ƿųʰ ńʰ ī ʰ {ȑʰ đǀɥ (ŴGʰ
ʰ Ġǁ Mǂʰ C#h9¤ʰ 2ȈÂʰ ģ ʰ

nʰ  ʰ Wȶ$%ʰ =Ǝʰ ɧƢɉ  ʰ Ţʰ Ĺɨǃ ʰ 2Ǆɩʣʰ ʟǅʰ ʰ ɪɊ1ƚƣʪ
%1ɫʰ Ƥʰ ĺɋ8> ¥ʰ sʰ Ñ'³áâʰ

ʜ!>ʰ

ã-Jñʰ ,ʰ

Dʰ ʰ ƙ=ɮƦ9§ʰ )òʰ f·cóʰ SCĎʰ Dţʰ ǆ ʰ Ļ ʰ 2  ʰ

%ʰ

ʰ

ȷǇ;;ʤʰ -/5  <
' ʰ

nʰ

Gʰ  ŕ>ȥ ʰ Y ʰ .-29'0< )"äûʰ

Ƨʰ ?>ʰ Ə%ɛ0   ʰ /:ʰ Ēǈ ɯ

ÒÓ-gTʰ Ehʰ 4c¨ʰ ÔÕÿĉëdå ʰ
'T½ʰ

(ʰ 2ǉʰ Ȍȸ<ɰǊ?ʰ  ʰ ȹȦʔʰ j ʰ 1Ȕʰ Ŷ ŷȍ

ʰ Ťʰ

    

^M ʰ ʰ
ɳFʰ Ģʰ

, <(ʰ  ʕQ ʰ

, /(!<

ɱʰ

ļʰ -)%2 rŸ(©ʰ Y((ʰ

ʰ ʝ.ʰ ǋŹĽǸ@ʰ o>ɲĥǹ}ʨʰ

/2 W

ĭʰ Ǻʰ 6& ªʰ

ʰ 2

(+, Ŗ.

ʰ

ʰ ʰ  ʰ øC#)ʰ ?( ʰ ʰ

 ʰ ""ì_""e ʰ
'C ʰ

ɴʰ ʰ :  ʰ ŋ +ʰ P ʰ 1ʰ ɵʰ & ʰ ēɶǻʰ ʥʰ
ʰ

<ǌʰ ľʰ ʰ ʰ 

ɷʰ ƨ Ⱥ ʰ  Ʉ>ʰ

źʰ ŗɏF ʰ  ʰ Żǩʰ Ǎʖʰ ɸżǼǎȕʰ ,V3 ÖBĊ-TæÉ«ʰ

92/)< ĴÃĀ3×ØăĄŌS"'#9ʰ  ʰ 1ʰ "$2

ʰ ʰ

Ʃɐʰ Ž  ¾ʰ

'2 Ȼz ʰ +ʰ ōʰ <%ɹʰ Ń ʰ ɑNťʰ ,ÙB ĆHf9¬ʰ ɺ ʰ Ƌǭʰ Ǐ=1ʰ žǽǐ ʰ

'%&, Ŏʰ ȧ&ƫɻʰ Ǿ!ʰ Ƭņʰ ʰ Ņʰ Ȩ ʰ
Ƒʰ Eɼʰ
Ȁǔ ƃ ʰ
  #$), ŘŇȗɾʰ 46< 
+2 ʰ Ʈʰ  57< ʰ Ƚňʰ Ɠʰ , ʀʰ !ʰ ʘƔ:ǕŜǥ ʁʰ ʂʰ ʃʄǖȘʰ ʅƄʰ ʆȁʰ
6 ʰ 6 Ɗ&ʰ DŨʰ ğ0 ư´Ħ Ǘʩʰ *
ƕʰ Ưʙʰ  `ʰ
,
ɒɅʰ Ɛ%ɓʰ ƪ+ʰ

ȩʰ Ŧ ƭʰ ɽ ſǒȪʰ ŏȫʰ ƀɆʗǓɔƁŧʰ ƒ=ʰ

B3ʰ

l ɕʰ ZȂĿǘ!ʰ ŀʇʰ ʰ ʰ ɖʰ UǙ! 
ʈșʰ

ʰ ƛ2 ʰ 7 ʰ IāĂ7 -Őç#ʰ ʰ @ Fʰ

ʰ ȭ&ʰ ƱL ʰ ĵȚ  ʉ2Ķʰ ~?ʦʰ & ʰ ȮțQʰ őʰ 0 ʰ Ł!ʰ ʰ

Ȏ$7ʰ +ũʰ

,

 .  ^ʰ (Ɩ@ʰ ʞ Ȝʰ Ʋ18ʰ Śǚ Nʰ ʊʰ lʰ

ǧʰ &L]ʰ ĔɗǛ  ʰ  :ʰ ƗZʰ ʰ
&ƅ2®ʰ

, $3ʰ 3ʰ 5#5AÀʰ

ʰ ʰ

Ęʰ ʋ *!ʰ

Ƴʌʰ ʰ ǜȏYŪ ʰ 0 ǝȝ8ʰ ȾɞNʰ HÚąE)#Û-'S¯ʰ 
!ȯ ʰ :ȴʰ M  8ʰ ɘʍʰ Ǡ

ʰ ʰ

ś Ǧʰ

 !ʰ

!, ÜeuƘ A ʰ

ʯ,mʰ 2  ÝÇÁ"í4Ȅîb59aʰ

4I ʰ

ʰ

' ʰ

į$ʰ $Qʧʰ

%, 088ʎʰ 5:< ĕə$Ȱ Q\ʰ 0ʰ *(2 ,*2 Xǡq+%ƆǢǪʰ %ʰ
" ,  "Zʰ vʰ ƴ.*+Ɲʰ ʰ N  ʰ

sŒʰ ʰ $L%$qʰ E$Ɯʰ jǣ\ʏ%<ʰ
ʰ Ĳ ) Þbi7'#µßʰ +ʰ &,2   <a

"# <
"& <

Ƶʰ

B  5 59 

Ƈȱƈʑ*Ȳʰ 12 ,Ětʰ Ė ʰ VVĤÄʰ2 ô4'œè#¶éćʰ È`ʰ õdï öIù

Ğ%ʰ ʰ   Xʰ 7Lȅʰ

, x ʰ 

 ʰ Ɖʒ ȟʰ

ʰ &=ʰ ʰ kǬʰ  2 tʰ ę= G\ʰ Ȇȇ ʐʰ

ʰ

 ʰ !ƞʰ

% '%%,

, kǫʰ

02   ʰ ɀ ʰ

 ŉXʰ

 2

- 19 -

35.
36.

See p.

4 above.

See Daniel Devereux,

''Aristotle on the Active artd Contemplative Lives, "

Philosophical 'Research ·Archives 3, no .. l.118.

(1977), p.

7.

3 7.

See p. 1 above.

38.

See D. F. Pears, "Aristotle's Analysis of Courage," Midwest Studies in
Philosophy, III (1978).

39.

On to kalon as an end of action and to aischron as an object of avoidance see
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. 1117a 8, 16-17;

2.1122b6-7, 1123a24-25;
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40.
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See I.l.1094a6-9 and III.9.1117b7-8.
bravery that "it is not the case,
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then, with all the virtues that their
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1117bl5-16), the end in question is the external end.

41.
42.
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43.
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44.
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356
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If it be objected that Aristotle, in giving his final account of happiness in
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and an external end of action, the reply is that the internal end of action

is alluded to twice in the course of these chapters: see X.6.1176b6-9 and
8.1178bl2-13.
47.

See Ackrill,

Aristotle's Ethics, ad. loc.
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Stewart,
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